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In early modern Europe, as every schoolchild learns, states and elite 
families were often closely interlocked. Yet family history and state 
theory are generally studied separately today. I try' here to unite them 
by underlining the central role of family lineages and gender identities 
in the formation of patrimonial political structures, focussing on the 
Netherlands, a precocious and influential developer along a number of 
social and cultural dimensions? My thinking about this problem has 
been guided by several general questions. When did elite families and 
lineages anchor political stability, or contribute to political change? 
How did gender arrangements complement or crosscut these familial 
patterns? What are the implications for theories of state formation? 
In the Netherlands, I argue, elite male family heads seized hold of local 
state offices, constituting themselves as a regent patriciate. 2 Over time, 
increasing familial exclusiveness and the changing class character of the 
regents interacted with the axial position of the Dutch in the emergent 
world economy. The regents' dynastic grip contributed to the rise of the 
Netherlands as long as a locally-centered patrimonial state was an 
effective form of rule. But when competitor states took the first steps 
beyond patrimonialism toward a rational-legal bureaucratic apparatus 
staffed by means of patronage, the persistence of the Dutch familial 
state undermined the politico-economic viability of the Netherlands in 
the world economy. Thus, I argue that elite family patterns and dynam- 
ics in the Netherlands were one cause of that country's spectacular rise 
and decline. 
In all patrimonial states, state officials had two concerns: securing the 
state that provided their office, and maintaining the status and wealth 
of their families and lineages. During some periods, these goals could 
be jointly achieved - at others, not. In the latter case, efforts by office 
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holders to secure their families' position could dominate, leading offi- 
cials to act in ways that promoted the decay of the state and the politi- 
cal economy more broadly. Variations in familial state configurations 
are important, of course: the Dutch state, which conjoined intense 
localism and patrilineal inheritance of privilege and office, differs from 
the pre-revolutionary French or Chinese states, to name just two exam- 
ples. Nevertheless, variants of the general familial patterns and dynam- 
ics apply to all patrimonial states, as I show below. First, however, I turn 
to analyzing the links between patrimonial rule and elite families. 
Patrimonial elites, patriarchy, and privilege 
What, precisely, is patrimonialism? 3 This distinctive form of rule is 
typified by a segmentation of sovereignty between rulers and corporate 
elites. Patrimonial rulers rule by granting exclusive politico-economic 
rights and immunities to self-governing corporate groups, which are 
liable for certain reciprocal obligations to the ruler. In doing so, rulers 
are simultaneously gathering funds and deploying their power, while 
corporate elites in turn get economic concessions, political representa- 
tion, and derived symbolic status. 4 Sovereignty is institutionalized in a 
set of interdependent relationships among rulers and the corporate 
bodies (clans, estates, towns, guilds, chartered companies, and so forth) 
that undergird their rule. It is dual, not unitary, with pronounced ten- 
dencies toward further segmentation and fragmentation. 
In the Netherlands, a powerful urban regent patriciate, based in cor- 
porate bodies such as the town councils (vroedschappen) and provin- 
cial states, and privileged monopolies like the East and West Indies 
Companies, faced a series of weak patrimonial rulers - first the Habs- 
burgs' delegates, followed by emissaries of France and England, and 
finally the indigenous provincial stadholders (stadhouders), traditional- 
ly drawn from the House of Orange. 5 The regents resisted their would- 
be sovereigns' efforts to govern, opposing efforts to create new cor- 
porations or revive traditional or fictive ones, to appoint relatively 
autonomous bureaucrats, or to call on alliances with other patrimonial 
powers. 6 Such policies, however traditionally acceptable, threatened to 
disperse and devalue elite privilege, or even to abolish it altogether. But 
the Dutch regents could not simply dispense with their opposite num- 
bers, the stadholders. Even in the two so-called stadholderless Eras of 
True Freedom (Ware Vrijheid) when the regents temporarily governed 
alone, their own politico-economic position drew on the executive 
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capacities and symbolic incarnation of sovereign unity embodied in the 
institution of the stadholderate. 7 The regents did gain an. extraordinary 
degree of power within those limits. As opposed to pre-revolutionary 
France, where a series of rulers asserted politico-economic authority 
over elites in an absolutist fashion, or England, where a fractious bal- 
ance was struck, Dutch corporate elites managed to gain wide control 
over local state offices and privileges, resulting in a locally-based esta- 
fist patrimonialism, s 
Corporate elites everywhere depended on patrimonial offices and 
privileges, and they pursued them assiduously throughout early 
modern Europe - a practice known as kuiperij (machinations) or 
ambtsbejag (hunt for office) in the Netherlandso 9 Contemporaries 
wrote stilted poetry hailing office and the prerogatives of privilege as a 
source of political power and a badge of status. "Happy Hasselaars!" 
enthused a typical ode on the occasion of a marriage in the Dutch 
regency, in this case between the cousins Gerhard Hasselaar and 
Suzanne Hasselaar in Amsterdam in 1752. "The country has placed in 
your tutelary hands/ The sword of Themis and the Depot of the 
Laws...." The poet further abjured Gerhard to exercise his offices in 
the illustrious tradition of his patrician ancestors. 1° Contemporaries 
also thought of money. "Everyone knows that the quickest way to get 
rich is to get into the government and that is the reason that men pay to 
get in," wrote the Dutch pamphleteer Claudius Civilis in 1747. ~1 At the 
pinnacles of patrimonial states, economic rewards (and risks) could 
indeed be enormous. ~2 In the Netherlands, the regent patriciate re- 
ceived fixed "rents" or intermittent windfalls from office, such as the 
sheriff's (schout) percentage of the fines he imposed, an income that 
could be quite extensive, especially in the eighteenth century. ~3 Beyond 
serving as a direct source of resources, state offices and privileges were 
a vehicle for broad control over the conditions of making and keeping 
money, and over economic affairs generally. Dutch regents, for exam- 
ple, who invested over half their fortunes in state bonds in the eigh- 
teenth century, also used their positions in the state to decide the in- 
terest rates that their loans would command, and to block reforms in 
the fiscal system that seemed disadvantageous to them. TM 
Last but emphatically not least, there was a gendered, familial com- 
ponent to the pursuit of patrimonial privilege. Dutch regents were 
stirred by visions of their own ascendant lineages (geslachten): in that 
they were typical of early moderu elite family heads, whether landed or 
mercantile, petty squires or rulers. 15 Paulus Teding van Berkhout 
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(1609-1672), a member of the Hague patriciate, characteristically 
reminded his children that they formed only "a link in a growing chain" 
of Van Berkhout generations, and that they should care for the wealth 
and possessions intended not only for their pleasure, but for the 
family's descendants (nageslacht) - those men whose name he bore, 
and who would bear his name in turn. 16 Heritable privileges, including 
patrimonial offices and rentes, functioned as both lineage property and 
a kind of "property in politics" in many Old Regime societies, including 
the United Provinces. Corporate elites acquired pieces of the nascent 
state, in some cases selling them or passing them on to descendants. 
These properties came to resemble land, as relatively immobile family 
assets. 17 When dependence on patrimonial privilege was essential to, 
and even the primary basis of, elite families' dominant position, con- 
veying reliable access to privilege to the next generation became an 
urgent matter, synonymous with the social reproduction of the family 
itself. 
Viewed from one family's pespective, there were several ways in which 
to do this, in which, that is, a family could ensure that its son and heir 
acceded to a position of privilege while conserving his status as a repre- 
sentative of the patriline. The family could buy an office or privilege. TM 
But the solution of venality was not always possible in a patrimonial 
political economy. Most high offices in the United Provinces could not 
legally be directly bought and sold, or formally inherited, although 
elites did buy lesser but lucrative state offices for their progeny, such as 
the venal postmasterships. More often, Dutch families followed a 
second path, that of nepotism. Family heads had prospective heirs 
appointed to non-venal offices, in many cases simply appointing them 
themselves. These offices lay at the outset of conventionally under- 
stood career paths, ending in a directorship of a privileged corporate 
body, such as the East Indies Company, a seat on the town council 
(vroedschap), or even access to its inner circle, the mayoralty (burge- 
meesterschap). If all went well, an heir would eventually either ascend 
into the regency, or (if his father were already a regent) replace him as 
the family head and its political representativeJ 9 Of the first thirty-six 
Amsterdam vroedschap members in newly independent Holland 
(installed in 1578), only nine who had available descendants or rela- 
tives were not succeeded by them at their deaths, a pattern that charac- 
terized the Amsterdam patriciate down to the end of the early modem 
era. 2° Furthermore, for much of this period, nepotism was seen as per- 
fectly acceptable: the eighteenth-century diarist who commented un- 
critically that Mayor Bicker of Amsterdam had earmarked the sinecure 
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of vendumeester van schepen en koopmanschappen, %vorth 6000 guil- 
ders a year;' for his fourteen-year-old son Henrik appears to have been 
typical. ~1 
Family heads who wanted to install or maintain their families in the 
sanctum of high office also had to practice the "politics of marriage" 
(huweli]kspolitiek): to marry well, and marry their children well. "Men 
frequently regarded marriage in terms of what it would do for their 
line," concludes one historian of the early modern Dutch landed gen- 
try; the same was true of urban patriciates, in the United Provinces and 
elsewhere in Europe. 22 Marriage gave a family normative claims on the 
allied family's patrimonial privileges and offices (which could, in the 
case of lesser offices, be directly acquired via dowries) and it created a 
web of political supporters. The "right" alliance also polished family 
prestige. 23 Not surprisingly, elite families kept careful genealogical 
records - not only of their own pedigrees, but of other families with 
which they had intermarried, and sometimes of those with which inter- 
marriage was considered plausible. The powerful Backer family, for 
example, researched or collected the genealogies of 320 other Amster- 
dam regent families, many of which were related by marriage to the 
Backer clan, as well as drawing up huge chronological lists of Amster- 
dam families that had boasted one or more burgomasters from 1343 to 
1727. 24 As far as these Dutch genealogists were concerned, other fami- 
lies were categorized and evaluated as good lineages and marital pros- 
pects in terms of the temporal depth and continuity of the representa- 
tion of their male members in patrician offices and, if they were noble, 
landed estates. 
The importance of marriage to elite and especially regent families was 
also evinced in the close management of children's marital prospects, 
culminating in complex and protracted negotiations between the family 
heads who were considering whether to consent to the alliance, 25 and 
in wedding rituals so elaborate that town governments weighed sump- 
tuary laws restricting the extravagance of the festivities. 26 Dutch elite 
families did not generally arrange marriages for their sons and daugh- 
ters, but they did exercise a significant amount of control. Parents and 
conventionally designated members of the kin group sponsored the 
social activities at which eligible candidates were scrutinized, and 
parents retained legal veto rights over their children's choice of spouse 
until 1809, after the collapse of the Dutch Old Regime, invoking them 
on the rare occasions when children flouted normative constraints. In 
those limit cases, families levelled negative sanctions against perceived 
misalliances, including disinheritance and social ostracism. 27 
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From the perspective of the family, the two practices of marriage and 
inheritance were interdependent. If each wedding and inheritance set- 
tlement represents the playing of a card in the family's hand, to adopt 
Pierre Bourdieu's metaphor for a moment, each move in the "game" 
depends both on the hand that has been dealt, and the family's skill in 
playing it. 28 The family's hand was played with an eye to a collective, 
intergenerational career path. It was conceived by the players as reach- 
ing fruition over several generations of politico-economic accumula- 
tion and alliances, and involving differing degrees of sacrifice from 
various family members who thought of themselves as joined in a com- 
mon lineal fate. Two important methodological implications follow. 
First, the temporal horizons within which actors made decisions ex- 
tended beyond any one individual's life expectancy, and the behavior of 
family heads will make sense only if we keep this in mind. Second, the 
members of the elite family acted with reference to the patriline and the 
group, and their actions must be situated accordingly. Yet to say that 
these families shared an idea of a common fate is certainly n o t  to say 
that family members shared values stressing equality or that intra- 
familial stresses and tensions were absent. Sacrifice for the lineage was 
unevenly distributed along the lines of gender and age, as was the ca- 
pacity to reshape one's lot. 
Consider the likely trajectories of the children of the regency. Higher 
offices were traditionally reserved for the eldest sons, even when a 
town charter did not limit the number of immediate family members 
that could sit on the town council, so younger sons were relegated to 
lesser positions, assuming the roles of supporter of and understudy to 
their older brothers. They could sometimes marry into other elite fam- 
ilies, becoming the surrogate son and heir if that family lacked o n e .  29 
Others among them sought fame and fortune in the Indies, hoping to 
return to found a collateral branch of the family in another town. In 
very rare cases, younger brothers contested their subordinate posi- 
tion. 3° The agency of daughters was even more sharply circumscribed. 
They could marry, or remain in the bosom of their family of origin. The 
regency was largely Protestant, so the cloister doors were closed to 
most of its women. 
Bourdieu's card-game-theoretic analogy breaks down at this point, 
because it bypasses the role of power in the family, and the affectual, 
nonrational component of family practices. In a patriarchal patrilineal 
system, first of all, men are the key players. Daughters marry and are 
absorbed into families different from those into which they are born, 
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and the generalized exchange of women helps guarantee trust among 
men. al It functions as a medium by which the heads of the families con- 
cerned recognize past politico-economic alliances and commit them- 
selves to present and future connections. In Amsterdam, the judicious 
gift of a daughter could buttress an old political faction, or shift a man 
into a new one, as when the prominent regent Corver married his 
daughter Maria Margaretha to his enemy Nicolaas Geelvinck as a 
peace offering. 32 Second, the moves made by male family heads (and 
male and female surrogates acting in their places) are informed by his- 
torically specific forms of masculinity, by values and norms that 
emphasize the role of the male progenitor and the centrality of patri- 
lineal selfhood. Messages about the value of the lineage and a man's 
place in it emphasized genealogies of office, rather than a strict aristo- 
cracy of blood. 3~ The Bicker family archive in Amsterdam holds an 
emblematic document that testifies to the author Hendrik Bicker's 
pride in his patriline's past record and future prospects, as well as to the 
Bickers' long representation in city government offices and monop- 
olies. Headed "Fourteen Generations Beginning with...", it spans a 
two-hundred-fifty year period from the 1400s to the 1680s, listing each 
Bicker male, his offices and privileges, the names of his wife or wives, 
his sons who also held positions, and culminating with Hendrik him- 
self, at that time an Oud-Schepen, a member of the magistracy. ~4 The 
document was to be passed down to Hendrik's sons, to be continued by 
future generations. The Bickers' is a particularly detailed example, but 
such records are not unusual. 35 Along with the office genealogies came 
other items symbolizing the patriline's continuity: family portraits, the 
house, the largest portion of money. 36 For men in the regency, their 
own patriarchal honor, patrilineal pride, and patrimonial privilege 
could not be parsed. 
The family values of dominant men are of predominant interest here, 
because they mattered more than women's subcultures for high politics. 
The values held by dominant men were multivocal, but more straight- 
forward than elite women's. Women faced conflicting calls on their 
allegiances when they left their natal lineages and joined others at mar- 
riage, 37 and women's "virtue," understood in a cultural context of 
sexual purity and subordination, symbolized the honor and integrity of 
both the patrilines from which they sprang and those that they joined 
and perpetuated. 38 Equally important, male family heads were able to 
act on their values, mortgaging their own and their family's futures for a 
dynastic vision, and trying to use the state to that end. But note that 
family heads were themselves systemically constrained. Father's and 
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son's capacities to dispose of family property were legally circum- 
scribed in favor of descendants, and the family sanctions directed at 
mesalliances included those contracted by the head of the family him- 
self.  39 The reproduction of the patrilineage was normatively governed, 
functioning as if the position of men took precedence over that of 
women, and that of the eldest over the youngest, with the first rule 
limiting the second. 4° There were minor differences between the family 
practices of regents and landed elites in the Netherlands in this regard. 
Among the Dutch regent patriciate, great wealth and the relative mo- 
bility and divisibility of finance and merchant-capital stocks, major 
forms of regent assets, allowed daughters and younger sons to inherit 
part of the patrimony. Dutch women's property rights also varied 
regionally, and were in general better than those of English elite 
women. 41 Nevertheless, the eldest son (or his functional substitute) was 
preferred among both the landed gentry and the regent patriciates, 
whether in inheritance of the family demesnes, or in filling the offices 
identified with the family, respectively. 42 
Although analysts have repeatedly registered the empirical presence of 
family and gender in politics, it is striking that theoretical analyses of 
patrimonial systems have failed to do justice to the gendered, familial 
component of the motivations of elites and rulers, or of the rules of 
reproduction of the system itself. 43 These analyses have thus missed the 
range of social-structural and ideological outcomes that ensued. When 
the reproduction of a ruling elite rests on gendered family principles 
(including marriage, inheritance, and paternal authority), then familial 
patterns are also constitutive of societal modes of politico-economic 
reproduction. They determine how political alliances are formed and 
how power is transferred, how new members of the elite are recruited, 
and how political rule is legitimated. The next section deals with how 
these rules of reproduction came to characterize the patrimonial state 
itself. 
What is a familial state and how does it work?: The Dutch case 
As patriarchal family and lineal networks and ideologies were woven 
into the web of patrimonial power, they constituted a Dutch equivalent 
of what one might call a familial state. Let me clarify what I mean by 
that term. First, gendered familial criteria were constitutive of political 
authority. This era was still one, in Steven Ozment's memorable phrase, 
"when fathers r u l e d .  ' '44 The regents grounded their political claims on 
the basis of hereditary qualification and patriarchal power, rather than 
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on the basis of adherence to rational-legal procedure or other substan- 
tive standards of justice. 4s Beginning with Willem I, hailed as Vader 
Vaderlands (Father of the Fatherland), the stadholders also invoked the 
legitimating ideologies of paternal authority and dynasty in attempts to 
claim or consolidate the sovereign authority they insisted accompanied 
that office. They also drew on these ideologies when seeking to extend 
their authority to new territorial or substantive domains. In this they 
were less successful than their continental royal counterparts, but not 
completely so? 6 
Second, the important political offices and privileges were distributed 
to men on the basis of their family ties and position. Sitting burgomas- 
ters allotted the higher city offices to family members, and lesser ones 
to their clients, as well as exercising jurisdiction over appointments to 
key positions at the provincial and Generality level, such as deputies to 
the States-General and Raad van State. 47 Thus, family representation 
in the state extended both horizontally, such as in the town of Zutphen 
in 1747, when six of the twelve city aldermen belonged to one extended 
family, and over time, such as in Hoorn, where the Breedhoff family 
held the principal magistracies and postmastership for three genera- 
t i o n s .  48 Both tendencies were present in Amsterdam. 49 The stad- 
holders and their lieutenants also sought to build familial patronage 
networks with the offices and privileges under their jurisdiction, draw- 
ing on the noble dynasties of van Heeckeren, Bentinck, or the Schim- 
melpenninck van der Oye, for top posts in the military, church, and 
judicial hierarchies, s° Regents and stadholders composed and created 
dynastic officialdoms. 51 In the case of the position of the stadholders 
themselves, who were traditionally from the House of Orange, the 
potency of family criteria in state recruitment is obvious. 
States can be said to be in the making when properly political functions 
are anchored in a relatively centralized, differentiated organization that 
controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within a con- 
tiguous territory, s2 The more developed the state, the more that politi- 
cal activities are organized in specific institutions, and the more that 
roles in the state sector are handed out according to a set of distinct, 
specialized requirements, rather than according to incumbents' roles in 
other institutions - including the family. 53 In patrimonial systems, both 
the relationship among state positions and the legitimation of the 
nascent state are in part familially defined. Thus, patrimonial systems 
should be conceptually distinguished from both rational-legal bureau- 
cracies, and patronage systems, in which holders of offices are recruit- 
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Structure of positions 
Familial Non -familial 
Principles of 
recruitment 
Familial Patrimonialism Patronage 
systems 
Non-familial Janissary Rational-legal- 
systems bureaucracy 
Fig. 1. Schematic typology of state structures. 
ed largely according to particularistic - including familial - criteria but 
in which offices themselves are bureaucratically structured. They also 
differ from janissary-type systems, in which candidates for familially- 
defined or household positions were routinely recruited by capture or 
adoption, and stamped with new identitites (see Figure 1). 
In a patrimonial state, we would expect to find characteristically gen- 
dered, familial patterns of political conflict and alliance. Such was the 
case in the Dutch Republic. First, the stadholders and regents struggled 
over contending dynastic claims to rule. Orangist dynastic claims and 
the policies of international alliance and war that accompanied them 
persisted alongside, and in tension with, the power of the regent family 
regimes. Can we make sense of the history of the Dutch Republic, 
including its very survival as an independent state, without considering 
the charismatic and organizational role of the House of Orange in the 
war of independence against Spain? The impact of Willem III's marriage 
to his niece Mary Stuart and their ascension to the English throne as 
William and Mary at the Glorious Revolution? Willem IV's capacity to 
"play the English card" in his dealings with recalcitrant Amsterdam 
regents, by threatening English military intervention to force his re- 
instatement as hereditary stadholder with expanded executive powers? 
Surely not. Yet the stadholders never succeeded in becoming absolufist 
rulers, and not simply because the Dutch economy depended on trade, 
as is often asserted. The ebb and flow of their dynastic power cannot be 
understood without reference to the rhythms of family life. The capaci- 
ty of the House of Orange to make claims to wider dynastic preroga- 
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fives that promoted their power at home - including rights of succes- 
sion to England's throne - was undermined by the history of pos- 
thumous male heirs and long minorities that marked the so-called 
"stadholderless eras" and favored the consolidation of estatist patri- 
monialism. 54 
The regents also fought among themselves. Recruitment of relatives 
could lead to flagrant violations of traditional limits on town councils 
inscribed in civic charters, as regents sought to include more of their 
male relatives. An outraged 1736 letter to the Holland Raad van State 
from Balthasar Huydecoper called attention to attempts by the Texel 
regents to do just that. 55 Letters and legal cases decry alleged family 
take-overs of local East Indies Company boards. 56 These sorts of prac- 
tices evoked resistance from opposing, often newly-displaced, cliques, 
and were accompanied by multi-generational conflicts among families 
inside the state. In the Amsterdam vroedschap, the rivalry between the 
Bickers and the hard-nosed Calvinist colonial merchant Reynier Pauw 
and his sons' faction continued throughout the first half of the seven- 
teenth century. 57 "Two houses, both alike in dignity..." but even more in 
ambition. Regent family feuds were overdetermined by the stacLholders' 
family claims and clienteles. Throughout the early modern era, power 
shifted back and forth between patriciate families sympathetic to the 
Orangist cause and those intent on minimizing the stadholders' influ- 
ence. 58 
When access to a city council seat became definitive of regent family 
position, family feuds in the patriciates became more heated, and the 
increasing stakes involved provoked an unmanageable level of compe- 
tition among the corporate elite. This problem pervaded the urban 
regencies by the eighteenth century. In the Amsterdam vroedschap, 
family fault-lines crystall~ed in the famous Sautijn Scandal, when a 
clique led by burgomaster Jeronimus de Haze de Gregorio, nephew of 
the well-connected Joannes Hudde, and opposed to the ascendant 
Corver family, exposed the extortionate office sales of Willem Sautijn, 
the brother of burgomaster Nicolaas Sautijn (member of the Van Bam- 
beeck family clan and staunch Corverite), and his associate burgomas- 
ter Jan Six, also a member of the ruling Corver faction. Sautijn and Six 
had sold offices for thousands of guilders and divided the proceeds 
between themselves. In 1717-1724, Sautijn had made a minimum of 
22,820 fl. via office sales, including many in the East Indies Company. 
During the long and acrimonious trial (1724-1731), many prominent 
regents were found guilty of selling offices, including burgomaster Jan 
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Trip; Pieter Six, schepen and later burgomaster; and Bonifacius Bis- 
schop and Arend van der Burch, both members of the Admiralty 
Board. Nicolaas Sautijn even sold a gravedigger's office for 8,000 guil- 
ders in 1721, which may have been the cause of his not being elected 
burgomaster again after 1725. In an ironic twist, De Haze himself was 
found to have sold offices in 1723: among others, the office of East 
Indies Company boekhouder van de equipage for the tidy sum of the 
16,000 guilders. 59 These leading lights of the regency ended up in 
court not because their actions were unusual, but because heightened 
family conflict over leverage in the town council bared habitual but 
nominally illegal practices. 
Dynastic struggles have long been thought to affect political cycles, but 
we know much less about their impact on politico-economic trajec- 
tories. 6° The Dutch case offers an instructive and ironic exemplar of 
the unintended developments that can stem from the successful resolu- 
tion of a collective action problem. The regents reacted with an array of 
settlements, or contracts of correspondence (contracten van correspon- 
dentie). These contracts formalized the distribution of city offices in 
written succession rules, which laid out systems by which all eligible 
elite families would take turns getting mayoralties, East Indies Com- 
pany directorships, and other corporate privileges. The contracts regu- 
lated the membership in and control over corporate bodies, which were 
the conditions for capital accumulation, political power, and family 
honor. In the short run, they were a brilliant institutional solution: they 
protected specific families' stake in an offfice, and guaranteed that all 
regent families' office genealogies would continue unbroken. By regu- 
lating relations among dynasts, the contracten van correspondentie 
solved this early modern elite version of the classic "tragedy of the 
commons. ''61 Such contracts existed in Hoorn from the 1720s, in Gou- 
da from 1748, in Leiden from 1702-1721 and 1741 on, in Amsterdam 
from 1752, and elsewhere. 62 
The contracts even addressed potential pitfalls, or threats to regent 
dominance. First, when successful dynasties hold power on a per- 
manent basis, they tend to accumulate clients and are more likely to fall 
due to overspending on patronage. 63 This was a real possibility in the 
Netherlands, where many high offices or privileges carried rights to 
dispense or sell other privileges, and where the States-General en- 
dorsed the traffic. 64 The alternation among dynastic groups minimized 
this particular byproduct of the prerogative of successful dynasts to 
name non-familial clients to lower-level positions. Second, such a sys- 
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tem enabled the regent dynasts to close ranks against outside pressures. 
It frustrated the stadholders' attempts to encroach further on regent 
prerogatives. 65 These features, which were most likely unanticipated 
outcomes of the contracts, made the system even more stable. Regent 
families had successfully laid claim to political institutions, which be- 
came the de facto inheritable property of various lineages. Intentionally 
or not, the male representatives of these families had constituted a state 
that had the functional effect of reproducing their patrilineages. 66 
The formalization of family appropriation of state office reaffirmed 
family exclusivity in the regent patriciate. Regent circles became in- 
creasingly closer to new entrants, and a smaller circle of elites con- 
trolled offices mor~ tightly. 67 This closure was compounded by the fall- 
ing birthrate of the regency in the eighteenth century, and produced 
demographic shortfalls of men from regent families deemed suitable 
for high office, and dramatic and persistent vacancies in the town coun- 
cils. 68 In some cases, such as in Hoorn and Leiden, the vacancies were 
filled via recruitment of burg~hers, who were married off to regent 
daughters. In Hoorn the demographic crisis spanned the entire decade 
of 1711-1721, and provoked the patriciate to replenish its ranks from 
the town's wealthy merchants by means of this method. In other cases, 
such as in Gouda, the regents sought to recruit new members from out- 
side their city. 69 Elsewhere, however, the regents simply recognized and 
accepted the shrinkage of the state body. They did not call for any 
broadening or relaxation of the gendered, familial criteria for admit- 
tance. 
It would have been surprising if they had done so. Family structures 
and norms constrain these criteria, and these structures and norms are 
not infinitely malleable. The normative definitions of who is included in 
families and who may join or head them vary, but within institutional- 
ized limits. The idiom of the '~orbidden degrees" (verboden graden) of 
marriage, to give just one salient example, was both legally established 
and enforced by religious, civil, and community sanctions throughout 
western Europe. 7° Furthermore, it seems likely that the formalization 
of family/state links would have strengthened the position of the father 
in regent families, both by augmenting the resources he controlled, and 
by symbolically investing him with political authority, making it less 
likely that he would want to dilute or sacrifice his position. If further 
research upholds this hypothesis, it may also help explain why his- 
torians have failed to uncover systematic evidence of increased warmth 
and affect in regent families, in contrast to burgher or even more hum- 
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ble families, over the course of the early modern period. 71 The identifi- 
cation of regent family head and state would have created powerful 
pressures countering the rise of a more egalitarian, companionate fami- 
ly among that fraction of the elite, and would have been likely to have 
imbued the family head with an even greater sense of his own patriar- 
chal importance. 72 
The regents' embrace of politico-economic privilege and office was 
also associated with a turn away from merchant capitalism toward pas- 
sive rentiership. 73 The fortunes of Leiden regents are relatively typical 
in composition. From 1700 to 1780, over 62 percent of their capital 
was invested in state bonds, and under 1 percent in trade or produc- 
tion. By contrast, Leiden merchants and manufacturers invested 22 
percent of their capital in trade or production. TM The tilt toward rentier 
status was accompanied by the admission of fewer merchants into the 
town councils from the late seventeenth century. Of the twenty-four 
new mayors in Amsterdam during 1718-1748, for example, only two 
were active merchants. 75 The percent of burgomasters and councillors 
with no recorded occupation (who are conventionally assumed to live 
off their rents), and who owned a country seat, also rose over time, 
although not monotonically. 76 This trend extended to VOC director- 
ships. Twenty-three (30 percent) of the Amsterdam directors between 
1748 and 1794 were merchants or manufacturers, while 38 (49 per- 
cent) had no recorded occupation, and were thus almost certainly ten- 
tiers. At least 52 (68 percent) owned a country seat. Thus, although 
there were proportionately more merchants and manufacturers in the 
VOC directorship than in the Amsterdam town council at large, the 
figure had dropped dramatically from the 100 percent of the VOC's 
inaugural years. 77 The shift from trade to finance capital, which offered 
a lower return on investment but higher prestige and economic securi- 
ty, was compatible with elite family heads' emphases on investing for 
their families with an eye to stabilizing the position of future genera- 
tions. 
Decl ine and fall 
When corporate family cliques captured offices and privileges in esta- 
tist patrimonial political economies, the effect on state policy and the 
political economy hinged on who they were and what they wanted: 
whether they were merchant capitalists, feudal landlords, landed capi- 
talist aristocrats, or a plurality of elites in conflict or coalition, whether 
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they wanted to expand colonial trade or dreamed of continental terri- 
torial conquest. This is not to argue for an ahistorical instrumental 
theory of the state, but to recognize the triangle of patriarchal family, 
dominant class, and political privilege that characterized early modern 
patrimonial systems in general and the Dutch case in particular. So, in 
the Golden Age (Gouden Eeuw) of seventeenth-century Holland, the 
merchant-capitalist Bicker family controlled the apparatus at the 
Amsterdam mayors' disposal, including the Indies Companies. Without 
overmuch hyperbole, one could say that this was the point at which a 
single family came closest to ruling the world. Then Dutch dynastic 
officialdom favored the explosive development of mercantile capi- 
talism on a world scale, advantaging Dutch elites and the Dutch popu- 
lation (but certainly not the peoples of Brazil, Africa, India, and Indo- 
nesia). 
Yet the Dutch political economy declined in the eighteenth century. TM 
Trade suffered, not only in the bulk commerce in grain, herring, and 
salt, but also in manufactured and finished goods, such as textiles and 
colonial goods destined for reexport. Other countries were increasingly 
able to process and ship their own commodities, dealing directly with 
one another instead of via the Dutch middleman, and to enforce pro- 
tectionist measures against the Netherlands. 79 The East Indies Com- 
pany's control in the Indies was the most enduring pillar of the entrepot 
system, but the VOC's politico-economic position deteriorated badly 
from mid-century, s° Indigenous manufacture was even harder hit. ~1 
This was a sturdy nail in the coffin of entrepot trade, for Dutch manu- 
facture rested on foreign markets over which the Dutch were losing 
their grip, and the conventional outlets for its products were disappear- 
ing. This was true of England too, but there the blow was dulled by 
investment in home industry, and the subjugation of expanded colonial 
markets, just as the Netherlands' markets were eroding. 
So what went awry for the Netherlands? The usual explanations of the 
decline (achteruitgang) attribute it to several politico-economic factors. 
Prominent among the external pressures cited are increased European 
economic competition and military inroads, especially into Dutch 
colonial territories. The domestic factors include a relative dearth of 
certain raw materials for industry, and comparatively high and rigid 
wages in urban areas. 82 No doubt these factors should figure as parts of 
any complete explanation. Yet the above arguments also point beyond, 
to an understanding of how Dutch statemaking and the exercise of 
power intrinsic to sustaining a system of entrepot and colonial trade 
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of central arguments. 
were also undermined from within. The very family practices and 
gender ideologies that had sealed in the rise of the Netherlands made 
possible the accumulation and strengthening of patrimonial privilege 
and position that contributed to its decline. Figure 2 represents the 
argument in its starkest form, to clarify the following narrative. 
How did the reproduction of lineages come to undermine the patri- 
monial political economy? The mechanism was an interactive one. As 
interfamily settlements, the contracts of correspondence reaffirmed 
and stabilized the localism of regent power structures. Taxes, naval 
policy, foreign and colonial policy remained subject to regent control, 
conducted via offices that the regents established, appointed, and filled, 
and state development took on a pronounced local cast. The over 
3,000 offices in mid-eighteenth century Amsterdam alone contrasted 
with the comparatively low total of central state offices, about one to 
two hundred in the early seventeenth century and only three hundred 
in 1800. 83 The naval and colonial apparatuses, which formed the politi- 
cal basis of Dutch mercantile strength and of the impressive military 
force the Netherlands brought to bear on European and colonial foes, 
were similarly structured. The. regents set up and headed the five over- 
lapping admiralties, responsible for the collection of customs in their 
areas and for maintaining the navy (funded by customs proceeds), as 
well as the multiple constituent chambers of the chartered companies, 
which were the major shapers of early modern colonial policy. 84 
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It is clear that the patriciate family regimes curtailed state support of 
domestic manufacture. The regencies consistently ignored manufac- 
turers' criticism of existing guild regulations, continuing to protect tra- 
ditional urban production and to create new guild structures beholden 
to them, and to maintain legislation against rural proto-industry. 85 The 
Amsterdam regents were also instrumental in blocking protective tar- 
riffs for domestic manufacture in the 1720s and again in the 1750s; the 
regents supported low duties and "freer" transit trade. 86 What is more 
surprising is how the system came to undermine trade itself, the life- 
blood of the Netherlands. The localism of the Dutch political economy 
had not been a significant disadvantage at the outset of the early 
modern period. Other European countries faced similar situations, ~7 
and the Dutch towns and their hinterlands were both relatively exten- 
sive and cohesive, and largely controlled by merchant capitalist fmnai- 
lies, rather than by landed feudal dynasties or unstable elite coali- 
tions. 88 By the latter part of the era, however, when the Dutch were no 
longer operating from an advantaged position in "the world political 
economy, and regent families had become exclusive, entrenched ren- 
tiers, this structure had become a poor framework from which to 
respond to the rising tensions occasioned by the decline of Dutch trade 
and the rise of British commerce and manufacturing. 
The system was messy and expensive. Contemporaries agreed that the 
overlapping naval and colonial organization was cumbersome, and 
deplored the inflated expense due to its administrative c o s t s .  89 More 
important, the organization disposed each enclave to respond indi- 
vidually to politico-economic pressures. Each admiralty cut customs 
rates, and collaborated with merchants in evading them, hoping to 
compete with its counterparts. 9° This Hobbesian scramble contributed 
to a drop in revenues, and to an insecure and inadequate supply of 
funds for the navy. 91 The chartered company directorates, merged with 
the regent elites, were subject to analogous dynamics, and proved 
equally impervious to reform from within and vulnerable to challenges 
from without. 9~ 
Certainly some of the regents and the stadholders were aware of the 
country's politico-economic problems, and considered ways to address 
them. Naval buildup would have required that enforcement mechan- 
isms be introduced for corporate bodies that lagged in their payments 
or refused to pay, and eventually that those intermediary bodies be 
eliminated altogether. Revamping the structure of colonial policy 
would have required changing the terms of the pact on which the Dutch 
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state was founded: its allotment of ultimate sovereignty to local and 
provincial corporate bodies, and the system of representation by which 
the regents constituted the policy-making members. The "enlightened" 
reformer Simon van Slingelandt, secretary to the Council of State and 
later Grand Pensionary (1727-1736), proposed the most thorough- 
going set of reforms along these lines: that the grip of the regencies on 
offices be loosened, and that rights to policy-making, taxation, and 
adjudication of urban and provincial differences be vested in neutral 
third parties (i.e., central state officials). Slingelandt's proposal was 
taken up by the Grote Vergadering of 1717, the second constitutional 
convention in the history of the United Provinces, but no changes 
could be agreed upon, and none was adopted. 93 Later suggestions for 
reform, although less precisely articulated, followed much the same 
pattern, and were also blocked. 
The regents' collective inertia in the face of these problems may seem 
puzzling. After all, they had collectively created the contracts of cor- 
respondence, so why couldn't (or wouldn't) they reform the state, one 
source of the Netherlands' politico-economic decline that seems to 
have been under their control? To reform the state, however, the regent 
family heads would have had to do away with its familial structure. Yet 
their money was secured in it. Their authority, status, and very identity 
were tied to the state, in part because it would also be their sons' and 
sons' sons'. Instead, elite families embraced their piece of the polity 
more tightly, just as the legitimating political symbolism of heredity, 
birth, and blood began to conflict with the newer Enlightenment and 
popular attitudes of merit, utility, and reason pervading eighteenth- 
century Europe, including the Netherlands. 94 
The formalization of the proprietary claims of regent families to state 
offices and privilege evoked struggles for change that gathered steam in 
local movements across the Netherlands in 1747-1748. For the first 
time, organized pressures against the regents emerged from the burgh- 
er strata "just below." Reform movements in the northern provinces 
sought to eliminate venality; 95 those in Holland and the south, such as 
that of Rotterdam, demanded that office sales be opened to a wider 
public, with proceeds going not to the regents, but to a truly public 
purse. 96 Although an analysis of the scope of the Patriot Revolution 
(1782-1787) lies beyond the scope of this argument, it is striking to 
note that the small merchants and manufacturers who sparked the 
sequence of municipal revolts challenged the position of both the 
urban patriciates and the Prince of Orange. They rallied the disaffected 
; 
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with familially-loaded charges of "nepotism," regent dynastic decay, 
and criticism of family government and the contracts of correspon- 
dence. Some strands of the movement criticized pretensions to patriar- 
chal authority, and celebrated the virtues of fraternal government and 
popular, or at least burgher, sovereignty. 97 
The regents and stadholder joined together to resist. They opposed 
democratic municipal elections and the elimination of their patrfl'nonial 
prerogatives, and violently suppressed the "Dutch Spring" (Lente) in a 
counterrevolution paid for by a loan of 90,000 pounds by the English 
state, and carried out by Prussian mercenaries. The conflicted and 
debilitated state fell to the French invasion of 1795 and was dis- 
mantled following a radical Patriot (French-sponsored) coup d'etat in 
1798. 98 The local family regimes, suppressed by the revolution., were 
reinstated after the French occupation was over, and endured in some 
towns, such as Amsterdam, until definitively broken by the constitu- 
tional revolution of 1848. 99 
Conclusions and issues for further exploration 
My argument that gendered family practices imparted specific dynam- 
ics to Dutch societal development is a resolutely open one, calling for 
comparative study. It prompts us to ask questions of other European 
patrimonial elites, whose lineage honor, capacities to accumulate eco- 
nomic resources, and abilities to exercise power derived from their 
membership in and control over corporate bodies. To what extent 
were they recruited into and did they exercise control over corporate 
bodies due to their statuses as current or prospective male family heads, 
as was the case with the Dutch regents and stadholders? Did the lack of 
differentiation between elite families and state privileges structure poll- 
rico-economic development in similar ways? When and under what 
conditions did the specific European articulation of powerful patriline- 
ages, bilateral kinship, barriers against endogamy, and strongly marked 
ideologies of gender difference encourage familial solutions to state 
vulnerability, such as replacing one ruling lineage with another, widen- 
ing the definition of lineal eligibility, or vesting power temporarily in a 
female relative of the ruling family who would govern as a surrogate for 
a male heir? When, alternatively, did this articulation create space for 
new, non-familial solutions? These questions suggest a restructuring of 
research agendas into the relations between the dynastic dynamics of 
patrimonial rulers and elites, and the consequences of those dynamics 
for state formation and policy. 
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The argument also opens toward non-European cases. In Old Regime 
China, for example, filiality was also a route to state power, and family 
principles and idioms were major factors structuring the articulation 
among the state's component parts. (It is not surprising that the critique 
of patriarchy and nepotism was a key feature of Chinese oppositional 
politics, just as it was in the Netherlands.) 1°° The familial state concept 
is an ideal type, an analytical tool that stresses certain characteristics in 
order to isolate common social-structural tendencies in a broad array 
of empirical situations. 1°1 Depending on the prevailing family form, 
however, the type concept can and should be made more precise. 
Nuclear (and stem) family forms predominated among the elite in 
northwest Europe, including the early modern Netherlands, while 
extended (and joint) families were common in many contemporary 
Eastern countries. The extended family structure characteristic of Chi- 
na, which was associated with joint households, put a premium on 
fraternal solidarity and evinced "a particularly authoritarian form of 
pariarchy," as well as a prominent political role for the mother-in-law~ 
"patriarchy's female deputy in the Chinese family." 102 To the extent that 
these and other specific family features were embedded in the state, I 
would expect them to foster distinctive forms of macro-political ten- 
sion, alliance, and change. 1°3 
This is not to say, of course, that gendered family practices were the 
sole causes of any historical outcome in the West or East. They were 
but one strand, albeit an important and analytically neglected one, that 
interacted with the rise of the capitalist mode of production in various 
ways. Wherever forms of politically-constituted property (or privately- 
or corporately-owned forms of power) remained in the hands of patri- 
monial elites, the intra-elite squabbling characteristic of patrimonialism 
was increasingly accompanied by new emergent tensions. The old 
patrimonial elites still depended on corporate bodies as key mechan- 
isms in securing, maintaining, and extending status, power, and wealth, 
but new and independent economic agents were not anchored in these 
bodies, and they called loudly for new forms of political power divest- 
ed of such "archaic" mutual obligations. TM This widening dichotomy 
was a feature of most early modern European countries; it was even 
present in countries like the Dutch Republic, where wage labor, rather 
than coercive exploitation of a peasantry, was the dominant type of sur- 
plus extraction. 
At this critical juncture, which arose in Europe at various times, the 
familial character of nascent states would be likely to block social- 
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structural development in two ways. The first hypothesized mechanism 
stems from the interests or desires of the occupants of state positions 
and holders of patrimonial privilege. They had an interest in maintain- 
ing their positions, and could be expected to resist substantial change in 
social arrangements when it involved loosening their grip on the state. 
Even when elites faced obsolescence, they would be likely to refuse to 
restructure or surrender their privileges. We can expect the actors in 
question, the male heads of elite families, to insist on this point, be- 
cause they had more then their own, or even their families', or their 
class' economic benefit in view. 1°5 They were also emotionally attached 
to patriarchal patrimonial family authority. The family bead's ideologi- 
cal identification, with the honor of the lineage was central to his self- 
representafion. 1°6 It engendered impulses that we "moderns" now think 
of as contradictory and mutually exclusive, such as the desire to sup- 
port his children economically and emotionally, and to deploy them as 
pawns in family strategies, but those impulses were not contradictory in 
early modern Europe. 1°7 There ties between parents and children, as 
well as between husbands and wives, were structurally mulfivocal, 
because they were embedded in the patrimonial package of fm-nily, 
dominant class and state, and embodied in genealogies of office. 1°8 
These genealogies were at once means of family survival, bids for 
power, and glorious narratives of clan honor. It is to be expected that 
elites would fight hard to defend them. 
The second hypothesized mechanism issues from the capacities, or 
rather incapacities, that familial states created. The repertoire of roles 
in such states was strictly limited, as were the incumbents and the 
acceptable idioms of rule. We can thus expect fan-filial state policies to 
be relatively inflexible with respect to capital accumulation and taxa- 
tion, particularly from the perspective of rising merchant and manufac- 
turing capitalists who were not tied to traditional corporate bodies. 
Furthermore, when family heads staked out local or provincial bodies 
as their own turfs, their implantation would be likely to raise structural 
barriers to policy formation and state-building on a national level. 
The differentiated development of a political structure does not neces- 
sarily make it functional or even viable. States can be unmade as well, 
along the same dimensions, including familial ones. In the Dutch case, 
as we have seen, the growing urgency of the demands placed on the 
patrimonial state by foreign economic competition and military threat 
encouraged endogenous devolutionary tendencies. Economic resour- 
ces, power, and legitimacy flowed to particularistic regent familial 
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regimes at the expense of the overall politico-economic structure in 
which those local regimes were embedded, however insecurely. The 
extent of coordination among key state elements - the multiple family 
regimes, urban and provincial governments, the regents and the stad- 
holder - declined, and processes of politico-economic disintegration 
set in, rendering the Dutch state more vulnerable and undermining its 
adaptability to external pressures. ~°9 Had politico-economic privileges 
and offices not functioned as the patrimony of elite families, I have 
argued (counterfactually), reformers would have been more capable of 
introducing measures to address politico-economic pressures at home 
and abroad, before the epochal revolutionary upheavals of the 1780s 
presented another, more drastic, solution. 
Under some circumstances, the barriers imposed by elite familial goals 
and the structure of state capacities they helped sustain could be sur- 
mounted. These obstacles were overcome in England during the 
seventeenth century. Elite families began to relinquish patrimonial 
privilege then, and the flight from privilege helped stabilize political 
power there in the following century. To what extent were innovative 
family practices a source of the English elite's notorious longevity, the 
comparative stability of the organization of political power and evolu- 
tionary changes in state government? We do not know. But one impli- 
cation of my argument here, if it is correct, is that the variability in the 
central trajectories of patrimonial societies, whether development or 
devolution, can be explained in part by variations in gendered family 
practices, and we should look to those practices for one answer to the 
English question. 
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1. In this article, the terms "United Provinces," "Dutch Republic;'and "the Nether- 
lands" all refer to the seven northern provinces and their contiguous dependent 
territory. "Holland" designates the largest of the seven provinces, and "Dutch" the 
people and the language. The "Low Countries" refer to the territory of the 
present-day Netherlands and Belgium. 
2. Regents (regenten) are conventionally defined as occupants of high state offices, 
notably the councils (vroedschappen) of the over fifty voting towns in the early 
modern Netherlands. In practice, they are a subset of the "elite;' which also in- 
cludes members of the landed gentry and merchant and industrial capitalists who 
do not hold office. 
3. For the classic discussion of patrimonialism, in which the following paragraph is 
partly based, see Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Uni- 
versity of California Press, 1968 [1922]), especially 226,293-297,  i006-1007,  
1010-1013, 1022-1023, 1028-1031. Other terms currently in vogue for this 
type of states include rico-feudal, predatory, absohitist, brokerage, tax/office, 
tributary, fiscal/military, and agrarian bureaucratic. 
4. Patrimonial privilege and the reproduction of the patrimonial polity itself are 
rooted in "traditional values;' which, as Mark Gould puts it, "necessitate a legi- 
timation of innovation in terms of past practice." See Gould, Revolution in the 
Development of Capitalism: The Coming of the English Revolution (Berkeley/Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 168. In such polities, notes Gian- 
franco Poggi, corporate bodies were "constrained chiefly by the concurrent, tradi- 
tional rights vested in other individuals and bodies" (The State, Its Nature, Devel- 
opment and Prospects, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, 48-49). Yes, 
although neither Gould's nor Poggi's otherwise excellent books recognizes that 
these bodies were shaped and honeycombed by family cliques, and that the "tradi- 
tional" rights and values on which they were based were patriarchal and familial. I 
discuss this issue further below. 
5. On the Habsburg period, the most useful English-language source is James 
Tracy's Holland under Habsburg Rule, 1506-1566 (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Uni- 
versity of California Press, 1990). (Given the likely audience for this article I cite 
English-language references whenever possible.) Subsequent quasi-monarchical 
protectors, chosen on the basis of Dutch alliances with France and England, were 
ousted after they tried to bend Dutch foreign policy to the dictates of the French 
and English crowns (I. Schoffer, "De Opstand in de Nederlanden, 1566-1702," in 
I. Schoffer et al., editors, De Lage Landen van 1500 tot 1780, Den Haag: Agon, 
1988, 146-152). After independence, each provincial State appointed a stad- 
holder (generally but not by legal necessity the same individual until 1747). The 
provincial States were in turn composed of deputies, largely regent delegates of 
the voting towns. 
6. See Tom Burns ("Sovereignty, interests and bureaucracy in the modern state," in 
British Journal of Sociology 31, 1980, 491-506) on patrimonial rulers' consolida- 
tion of authority by means of creating new corporate bodies, or reviving tradi- 
tional ones. 
7. "The customary way the history of the Dutch Republic is told, which makes the 
government of States-with-stadholder the normal pattern and the two stadholder- 
less periods ... interruptions that distort the pattern;' notes Herbert Rowen in The 
Princes of Orange: The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic (New York: Cambridge 
528 
University Press, 1988, 110-111) "may be as false as the opposite vision of the 
followers of De Witt in his own time and in subsequent generations who saw the 
Republic in its purity as government without a stadholder." See also pages 95-130 
and 148-162. 
8. See Weber's "rule by honoriatores (notables)" (Economy and Society, Berkeley/ 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968 [1922], 1009-1010; 1038- 
1042). "Estatism" is preferable, in my view, because it makes explicit the concep- 
tual parallelism to absolutism. For an English-language summary of the complex 
system of Dutch government, see Bernard Vlekke's Evolution of the Dutch Nation 
(New York: Roy Publishers, 1945). 
9. J. de Witte van Citters reviews instances of the ubiquitous pursuit of privilege in 
eighteenth-century Europe. See his edited Contracten van correspondentie en 
andere bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van her ambtsbejag in de Republie k der Ver- 
eenigde Nederlanden ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1875, v-xxxii). 
10. Amsterdam Gemeente Archief 292: # 1739. 
11. Cited in J.J. de Jong, Met goed fatsoen: De elite in een Hollandse stad: Gouda 
1700-1780 (Amsterdam: Dieren, 1985, 38). 
12. Witness Richelieu's "fruits of office;' the largest fortune accumulated in France 
until that time, or the dramatic trajectories of Essex, the Cecils, and many Tudor 
and Stuart grandees. For the sources of Richelieu's fortune, see Joseph Bergin's 
Cardinal Richelieu: Power and the Pursuit of Wealth (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985). On the English grandees, see Lawrence Stone's The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965, 398-504) and his Family and 
Fortune: Studies in Aristocratic Finance in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). Paul Bamford's Privilege and Profit: A Business Family 
in Eighteenth-Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1988) usefully disaggregates three major types of privilege that underpinned 
ancien regime French business fortunes: seigneurial domain, venal office, and 
state monopoly. 
13. For the schout, see O. Vries ("Geschapen tot een ieders nut. Een verkennend 
onderzoek naar de Noordnederlandse ambtenaar in de tijd van bet Ancien Re- 
gime]' Tijdschrifl voor Geschiedenis 90, 1977, 330) and J. G. Smit ("De ambtena- 
ren van de centrale overheidsorganen der Republiek in het begin van de zeven- 
tiende eeuw." Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 90, 1977, 388-390). 
14. The best English-language source on how the Dutch patricians structured the 
terms of their own loans to the state is James C. Riley, International Government 
Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1740-1815 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, 68-82). 
15. The lineage is the diachronic face of kinship: a patrilineage is said to descend from 
a "founding father;' and to persist in the form of a single line (when each genera- 
tion has one male child), or in branches (when there are several male children). 
See Andrejs Plakans's Kinship in the Past." An Anthropology of European Family 
Life 1500-1900 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, 213). 
16. Quoted in C. Schmidt ("Een lengteprofiel van her Hollandse patriciaat: Het 
geslacht Teding van Berkhout 1500-1950; '  in J. Albers and M. Prak, editors, De 
bloem der natie: Adel en patriciaat in de noordelifke Nederlanden, Amsterdam: 
Boom 1987, 133). Lawrence Stone and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone offer a witty dis- 
cussion of indirect heirs and name-changing among the English landed elite: "a 
fiction that was a necessity if the ideal of family continuity was to be realized in 
practice." (An Open Elite? England 1540-1880, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986 [1984]: 91). 
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17. For a general discussion of how this process functioned, see Ralph E. Giesey, 
"Rules of inheritance and strategies of mobility in prerevolufionary France," The 
American HistoricalReview 82 (1977): 271-289. 
18. In early modern France, after the paulette of 1604, even high offices were bought 
and conveyed by deed of inheritance. See Roland Mousnier, La Venalitd des Of- 
f icessousHenrilVetLouisXlll(Rouen: Editons Mangard, 1971 [1945]). 
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